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Abstract—The level of trust accorded to certification author-
ities has been decreasing over the last few years as several
cases of misbehavior and compromise have been observed. Log-
based approaches, such as Certificate Transparency, ensure that
fraudulent TLS certificates become publicly visible. However, a
key element that log-based approaches still lack is a way for
clients to verify that the log behaves in a consistent and honest
manner. This task is challenging due to privacy, efficiency, and
deployability reasons. In this paper, we propose the first (to the
best of our knowledge) gossip protocols that enable the detection
of log inconsistencies. We analyze these protocols and present
the results of a simulation based on real Internet traffic traces.
We also give a deployment plan, discuss technical issues, and
present an implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A public-key infrastructure (PKI) and cryptographic pro-
tocols, such as the widely deployed TLS, are crucial elements
for many applications on today’s Internet, as they enable
users to communicate sensitive data in a—supposedly—
secure manner. Unfortunately, since the inception of TLS,
many severe attacks have been reported [1], [2]. These attacks
concern not only the protocol itself, but also the oligarchical
trust model that TLS relies on. Certification authorities (CAs)
are usually considered as trusted by web browsers when their
self-signed certificates are present in the default list that major
vendors provide with their software. These CAs are numerous
(e.g., more than one thousand CA public keys are trusted by
Windows or Firefox [3]). Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities
and potentially compromise private keys in order to obtain
fake certificates, and CAs can also intentionally produce
certificates that will not be used by the genuine owner of the
corresponding domain. In particular, government agencies that
run or collaborate with CAs have the ability to impersonate
certain domains and intercept decrypted traffic through man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [4]. For example, cases of
unauthorized certificates issued by trusted intermediary CAs
have been reported in Turkey [5] and France [6]. To mitigate
these problems, several approaches based on the concept of
a monitored public log of certificates have been proposed.
They aim at making the issuance process more transparent
and accountable. However, introducing a log as a new trusted
third party moves the initial problem rather than resolves
it and raises the classical question “Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?” (Who watches the watchmen?) An ideal solution
would give users a way of verifying that they all share a
consistent view of the log, on a worldwide scale. Indeed, an
attacker who can obtain a fraudulent certificate and launch
a MITM attack may also have the ability to control the
log and provide a view that contains a specific certificate
only to targeted victims. This attack will be referred to as
a split-world attack [7]. To better illustrate it, we can take the
example of a malicious government that performs a MITM
attack on its citizens. To prevent this from happening, it is
crucial that clients have a means of exchanging information
about the log, even if our hypothetical government tries to
prevent anyone from reporting the attack.
A gossip protocol (i.e., a protocol in which peers select
partners in a somewhat random fashion in order to propagate
messages over the whole network) seems to be a promising
way of solving this problem, as it would be efficient and
convenient to deploy. However, we note that the term ”gossip
protocol” must not be taken strictly in the traditional sense in
this paper. As the protocol should not require a dedicated
network or infrastructure, peer selection is not completely
random but client-driven, i.e., gossiping is realized during
standard HTTPS connections and servers are used as inter-
mediaries to exchange information from client to client. The
gossip protocol should guarantee that misbehavior is detected,
while privacy concerns are taken into consideration. The
complex structure of the Internet and the diverse behaviors
of its users make developing such a protocol a challenging
task. Moreover, the gossip or epidemic-style protocols that
can be found in the literature [8], [9] are not applicable in this
context, as they generally require membership management or
an overlay network, instead of pre-existing connections.
The main contributions of this paper are: a) We present
different gossip protocols that meet the conditions stated
above and we demonstrate the properties that they ex-
hibit. b) We derive results about these protocols from a
simulation framework that we developed with the objective
of having an accurate model of Internet traffic, using both
public and private sources of statistical data that we had at
our disposal. c) We discuss deployment, and implementation
issues. d) We identify the possible attack scenarios and
show how the presented protocols can detect them. e) We
describe a proof-of-concept prototype of the system and show
performance results.
II. BACKGROUND
Merkle hash trees. The important data structure used in many
public-log systems is the Merkle tree, also called hash tree,
or just tree throughout this paper. More specifically, logs are
usually composed of a binary version of this tree in which leaf
nodes are hashes of some data (e.g., certificates) and non-leaf
nodes are hashes of their two concatenated children. Hash
trees have interesting properties for constructing a secure and
efficient log [10]. In particular, knowing the root (also called
head) of a tree, one can prove that a leaf is part of it, with a
number of nodes logarithmically proportional to the number
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Fig. 1: Example of two versions of a ChronTree. Proof that C4 is
present in the second tree (given the root h123456): {h3, h12, h56}.
Proof that the second tree is an extension of the first one (given roots
h1234 and h123456): {h56}.
of leaves. Provided that the tree is maintained in an append-
only manner and that entries are added in chronological order
(sometimes called ChronTree), the same holds for proving that
a hash tree is contained in (or contains) another hash tree.
Figure 1 shows an example.
Certificate Transparency (CT) [11] was among the first log-
based approaches to employ a hash tree (more precisely a
ChronTree), in order to build a publicly-verifiable database of
certificates. In this framework, anyone can submit a certificate
to the log server that responds with a promise to incorporate
the certificate into the tree within a time period referred to
as the Maximum Merge Delay (MMD). This promise takes
the form of a so-called Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT)
that must be delivered with the certificate by all TLS servers
supporting CT. The head of the most recent hash tree can be
retrieved from a log as a Signed Tree Head (STH), which
also contains the tree size and a timestamp. As the name
suggests, the entire object is cryptographically signed by the
log server. To verify that the log server is behaving normally,
two kinds of proofs can be queried. When a client receives an
SCT, it can verify that the corresponding certificate is indeed
present in the log by asking for an audit proof. In addition,
the append-only property of the log can be corroborated by a
consistency proof between two different tree sizes. At present,
the specification of CT does not require that those proofs
be signed; they should only contain the minimal number
of tree nodes needed to derive a tree head that coincides
with a known STH. Although signed proofs could, in some
cases, constitute evidence that a log is misbehaving and thus
help achieving the goal of our gossip protocols, we shall
assume, in this paper, that logs behave exactly as described
in the current documentation of CT. As of today, Google
is already running multiple pilot logs and Chrome supports
CT. It is required that Extended Validation (EV) certificates
issued after 1 February 2015 be present in some log(s) and
be delivered with one or more SCT(s). Ultimately, SCTs will
be required for all certificates [12]. The documentation of CT
suggests that gossip protocols might be a way of verifying the
consistency of logs. However, no protocol has been proposed
to date.
Roles and entities. The different participants in the system
can assume the following roles: Clients, usually web browsers,
establish connections to servers (identified by a domain name)
via TLS. Note that, in some cases, the term “client” might
be used to refer to clients of the log, but this is generally
clear from the context. Certification Authorities (CAs) are
responsible for the issuance of certificates. Logs allow anyone
to submit certificates and make these certificates publicly
available. Monitors inspect every new entry added to certain
logs to verify that they behave correctly and to detect illegiti-
mate certificates. They may even store entire copies of logs to
fulfill their objective. Auditors verify that the log is behaving
in a consistent manner with some partial information that they
have or that they fetch from the log. Different roles (e.g., client
and auditor, CA and monitor) may be assumed by a single
entity. Typically, CAs may want to monitor some logs in order
to verify that certificates are not incorrectly issued on their
behalf.
III. MODEL
Assumptions. To simplify technical descriptions, we gener-
ally assume that there is only one log, but our work can
be extended to multiple-log scenarios by running several
instances of the protocols in parallel. We also consider that
CT is fully deployed (i.e., within every TLS Handshake the
server sends an appropriate SCT) and there is some fraction
of servers and clients that use our protocol. It is assumed that
these clients and servers do not remove or modify gossip-
related data/software and that the cryptographic primitives
that we use are secure.
Adversary model. We consider that an adversary can operate
a malicious log and provide evidence that a certificate is
in the hash tree only to specific clients (split-world attack),
with the objective of hiding traces of this certificate to
other clients of the log that are potentially monitoring it. In
order to degrade the efficiency of the gossip protocol, the
adversary can introduce malicious clients/servers and inject
chosen messages into the gossip protocol. We also consider
the simpler case where the view is consistent, but an SCT is
produced by the log and the corresponding certificate is never
added to the tree.
IV. DESIRED PROPERTIES
The crucial property we seek is the detectability of a
log’s misbehavior, i.e., if the log presents a different set of
certificates to different clients at a given point in time, if
it does not respect the append-only property, or if, having
produced an SCT, it fails to add the corresponding certificate
to the tree within one MMD, then the gossip protocol should
detect it. The speed of detection must be considered, but
is not as important as the guarantee that any malicious
behavior will eventually be detected with high probability.
As the environment of the gossip protocol is the Internet,
the protocol should be scalable, i.e., when new clients or
servers join the system, the solution should continue to reach
its goal as properly as before (if not better than before).
The solution should also be efficient, in terms of storage,
computation, and communication (the number of out-of-band
connections should be minimized, in particular, connections
to the log server). Another important property is deployability.
The protocol must not require an additional infrastructure
or an overlay network, and the deployment must be done
seamlessly via a regular software update. Moreover, as the
deployment of such a system would likely be incremental, it
must be determined how effective the solution is in function
of the number of clients and servers supporting the protocol.
Additionally, the protocol must preserve users’ privacy. In
other words, it must not be possible to determine which
websites a user has visited based on the content of the
protocol’s messages.
V. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we give a high-level overview of message
flows and describe the actions performed by the different
parties. Figure 2 presents the notation that we will use.
sa: STH with tree size a.
sa ← sb: variable assignment.
pa,b: proof of consistency between sa and sb.
t: SCT sent by the server.
l: set of audited SCTs maintained by the client.
t 6∈ l: SCT t is not contained in the set l.
l← l ∪ {t}: SCT t is added to the set l.
m0: server’s default gossip message (only for Prot. 2).
m1: client’s gossip message (depends on the protocol).
m2: server’s gossip message (depends on the protocol).
g: associative array (map) of gossip messages, with
integer (tree sizes) as keys, sorted in ascending order.
g[a]: gossip message stored in g under key a.
g.size(): number of gossip messages stored in g.
g.keys(): set of keys stored in g.
g.removeF irst(): the first message (with the lowest tree
size) is removed from g.
∅: empty set/value.
µ: upper bound for the number of messages stored in g.
f : gossip factor, i.e., proportion of clients that gossip.
Fig. 2: Notation.
All parties can query the log with the following functions:
getSTH(): returns the latest STH.
getConsistencyProof(a, b): returns a consistency
proof between STHs with tree sizes a and b.
getAuditProof(t, a): returns the audit proof for the
certificate corresponding to an SCT t and a tree size a.
The only way to hold perfect evidence that the log is
misbehaving is to have two (or more) STHs (with a valid
signature) and observe that they are inconsistent. To detect
this, we will be using the following function:
checkSTHs(sa, sb, ...): STHs passed as arguments (or
STHs contained in more complex pieces of data, such as
gossip messages, given as arguments) meet the two following
criteria: Two STHs with the same tree size have the same
root hash, and an STH with a larger timestamp than that of
another STH has a larger or equal tree size.
This function does not give any output. If the verifications
passes, the protocol can simply go on, but if a verification
fails, the normal protocol flow immediately stops and the
inconsistency is reported/gossiped (as it will be described
in §VII). Also, clients and servers always verify that a received
gossip message is valid with:
validMessage(m1): returns a boolean value indicat-
ing whether m1 is non-empty and valid (according to the
message format definition of the given protocol in §VI).
A simple execution of the whole protocol is presented
in Figure 3. The initial (one-time) operation conducted by a
server’s owner is to contact the log, submit the certificate,
and obtain an SCT in exchange. Afterwards, the server
should send this SCT during the establishment of all TLS
1) gossip message m1
4) request
2) certificate, SCT t, 
gossip message m2
asynchronous communication
(e.g., reporting anomalies) 
3) update
3) update
5) STH, proofs
content synchronization
(every MMD)
4) request
5) consistency proof
0.a) certificate submission
0.b) SCT t
MonitorClient
Server Log
(a) Solid lines represent mandatory messages, dotted lines are optional flows,
and the dashed line represent the monitor’s role (see §II or [11]).
ClientHello
ServerHello, Certificate, SCT t
ClientKeyExchange, …, Finished
ChangeCipherSpec, Finished
HTTPS request, m1 (in header)
HTTPS response, m2 (in header)
ServerClient
m1 = getClientMessage()
m2 = getServerMessage(m1)
updateClient(t, m2) updateServer(m1)
(b) Detailed view of the client-server message exchange in steps 1–3.
Fig. 3: Overview of communication flows.
connections. Gossip messages are then piggybacked on the
requests and responses of client-driven HTTPS traffic. Before
a client connects to a server, a gossip message m1 is selected
with the function m1 = getClientMessage(). This
message is sent along the client’s HTTPS request. The server
receives this message and selects its own message accord-
ingly with m2 = getServerMessage(m1). Then, both
parties update their local state: clientUpdate(t,m2) and
serverUpdate(m1). Note that, for efficiency concerns,
the response must be selected immediately and the update
procedure must be performed after the response is selected
(and possibly after it is sent). Depending on the received
message, it might be necessary to request a proof from the
log to complete the update procedure. If there are multiple
logs in the system, the protocol can be executed in parallel
for each log, and several gossip messages (one per log) can
be sent. If an anomaly is detected, it must be reported to an
appropriate entity, which we will assume to be a monitor.
As the exchange is done through HTTPS, the client
receives (besides m2) the server’s certificate and a corre-
sponding SCT t. As gossiping SCTs may be inefficient and
cause privacy issues (there is a unique SCT for each certificate
in the log), we choose to gossip STHs. Upon receipt of an
SCT, there are several pieces of data that clients must fetch
from the log a) the latest STH (that should be stored), b) a
consistency proof between the latest STH and a previous one
(if available), and c) an audit proof—for the certificate that
corresponds to the received SCT—against the tree size of the
latest STH. The whole process can then either be repeated
every time an SCT is received or the SCTs (for which the
operation has already been accomplished) can be saved. These
two possibilities yield opposite outcomes in some aspects. The
former allow clients to have a more recent view of the log.
The latter, instead, may leave clients with an outdated view of
the log but requires a much smaller number of connections.
VI. PROTOCOLS
A. STH-Only Gossiping
In order to design an efficient and secure protocol, one
important observation needs to be made: any inconsistency
that can be detected with an STH of a certain tree size can also
be detected with an STH of larger tree size—provided that
the consistency between these two STHs has been proven. In
other words, if a tree extends another tree, the smaller one can
be discarded without decreasing the likelihood of detecting an
attack. Based on this principle, we devise an STH-only gossip
protocol, i.e., in which a valid gossip message simply consists
of a valid STH (a non-empty STH, in the right format, and
whose signature is verified with the known log’s public key).
As soon as clients obtain an STH from the log (as described
in §V), they store it and send it in all their gossip messages.
Servers and clients only keep the STH with the largest tree
size they encountered and send it in all their gossip messages.
When clients receive an STH with a different tree size than
that of the STH they already have, they always contact the
log for a consistency proof. If the proof is correct and if
the tree size of the received STH is larger than that of the
STH that is currently stored, then the client only keeps the
received STH. Clients keep track of SCTs and only contact
the log when necessary (as discussed before). Servers also
communicate with the log to obtain consistency proofs before
discarding STHs. If all parties perform this verification, then
a strong alert signal can be produced when the log server is
unresponsive. This approach is detailed in Protocol 1.
B. STH-and-Consistency-Proof Gossiping
We now design a gossip protocol with the same security
properties as the protocol described above, but we aim at
reducing the number of connections to the log, by gossiping
consistency proofs together with STHs. This is important not
only for efficiency reasons, but also to minimize the ability
of an adversary to infer who is gossiping and who is not. As
it will be discussed in more details in §X, if gossip messages
are conveyed through HTTPS headers, they are encrypted
and thus it is harder for a passive attacker to determine
whether a given client is gossiping or not. However, if the
adversary can observe the communication between the client
and the log, then it can guess, depending on the traffic, if the
client gossips. This possibility can be reduced if the type and
number of requests sent by the client to the log is essentially
the same whether the client is only CT-enabled or gossiping.
This second approach is presented in Protocol 2.
Message format. Messages have the same format for both
clients and servers. Let sa and sb be STHs for hash trees
of sizes a and b respectively, where a < b, and let pa,b
be a consistency proof between tree sizes a and b, then a
valid message m is a triplet of the form: m = (sa, sb, pa,b).
Clients and servers always verify that a given message is in
the right format (with validMessage()). This format is
desirable for the following reasons. Since consistency proofs
are not cryptographically signed, one cannot confirm that a
proof genuinely comes from a certain log, but if the two
corresponding STHs are provided with it, at least it can be
verified that it is valid, preventing attackers from flooding
servers with invalid proofs. Furthermore, with such a format,
if a message is valid but results in an inconsistency (e.g., two
STHs have the same tree size but not the same root hash),
it can only mean that the log is misbehaving. If an invalid
proof was sent alone or with only one STH, it could mean, in
some cases, that either the server or the log is the origin of
the problem, without any way for clients to determine which
one it really is.
Storage. Clients store three elements that correspond to the
content of a message, namely two STHs sa and sb and a
consistency proof pa,b. However, a valid message cannot be
immediately constituted, because this data is not available at
the very first execution of the protocol. Clients also keep a set
of audited SCTs. Servers keep a collection of valid messages
sent by clients. More precisely, servers store messages in a
map g.1 Servers also save the STH with the largest tree size
they encountered, denoted sn (initially set to ∅).
Message selection. Selecting a message on the client-side
simply consists of grouping the two STHs and the proof if
they are available, or returning an empty message otherwise.
On the server-side, the way in which messages are stored
allows a response to be selected efficiently. Servers simply
select the message in their map by using the tree size of the
STHs in the client’s message as a key, provided that such a
message exists. Otherwise, a default message m0 is sent.
Update procedure. If the server’s message contains a proof
that allows the client to obtain an STH with a larger tree size,
then the content of the server’s message replaces the client’s
previous data. Otherwise, a consistency proof is needed. If
the SCT delivered with the server’s certificate has never been
verified by the client, then the log is contacted for an audit
proof. If the message received by the server is not valid, it is
simply dropped. Otherwise, the server keeps the message in
its map under a key that corresponds to the tree size of the first
STH. If a similar message already exists, it is replaced. When
necessary, servers also request consistency proofs, but there
are two situations in which these proofs are not needed: when
one of the STHs in the received message correspond to the
STH with the largest tree size (sn) and the consistency proof
is valid, and when both STHs in the received message are
already stored (then the root hashes can simply be compared).
If a message m1 received by the server contains an STH with
a larger tree size than n, then n is updated and the default
message is set to m1. The message is stored if the tree size
of the second STH in the message is equal to or greater than
n. An upper bound µ on the storage size must be defined as
a configuration parameter. When this limit is reached and a
message is added, the first entry of the map (i.e., the message
referenced by the smallest tree size) must be removed.
1To reduce the size of this map and avoid duplicates, servers can store
STHs and consistency proofs separately and keep only references to these
instead of entire messages.
Protocol 1: STH-only gossiping (notation and auxiliary functions are defined in §V)
Client-side
Stored data: STH sa, set of audited SCTs l
Function getClientMessage() : message
return sa;
Procedure clientUpdate(t,m2)
Input: SCT t, server message m2 := sb
if validMessage(m2) then
checkSTHs(sa, sb);
if a 6= b then
getConsistencyProof(a, b);
if a < b then
a← b;
if t 6∈ l then
sc ← getSTH();
checkSTHs(sa, sc);
getAuditProof(t, c);
if (sa 6= ∅) and (a < c) then
getConsistencyProof(a, c);
sa ← sc;
l← l ∪ {t};
Server-side
Stored data: STH sb
Function getServerMessage(m1) : message
Input: client message m1 := sa
if not validMessage(m1) then
return ∅;
else
return sb;
Procedure serverUpdate(m1)
Input: client message m1 := sa
if not validMessage(m1) then
return;
if sb 6= ∅ then
checkSTHs(sa, sb);
if a 6= b then
getConsistencyProof(a, b);
if (sb = ∅) or (b < a) then
sb ← sa;
VII. REPORTING/GOSSIPING ANOMALIES
We made the assumption that a monitor has the ability
to receive and process the anomalies reported by clients or
servers. A monitor is the entity that fits best into this role,
since its function is to constantly verify that the log server
is not misbehaving, by contacting it at regular intervals and
possibly by keeping an entire copy of the tree. However, it
might not be possible to reach this monitor at all times, either
because it is blocked by an attacker or because of a technical
issue. This is why clients and servers should both report and
gossip about anomalies as soon as they are detected and as
long as the problem is not fixed (e.g., until a proof becomes
available or until the log becomes untrusted). Anomalies of
different kinds can be detected in several circumstances. When
it happens, the normal execution of the gossip protocol must
stop and a special message must be reported and sent in
place of all normal gossip messages. We define two special
messages.
A warning message (containing a description of the
problem and, if applicable, the incriminated STH/proof) is
generated when: a) The log is unresponsive (either because
it deliberately does not produce any response or because of
network issues), and it remains unresponsive after a number
of attempts (specified as parameter) to contact it again. b) The
latest STH has a timestamp older than one MMD before the
time at which it was fetched. c) An STH/SCT with an invalid
signature or an invalid proof is received from the log.
An inconsistency message is generated when the
checkSTHs function (as described above) fails. This mes-
sage consists of two or more valid STHs (signed by the log)
that mutually present an inconsistency concerning their tree
size, root hash, or timestamp.
The recipient of a warning message must independently
verify, by contacting the log, that the described problem
exists (provided that such an observation, e.g. ”the log is
unresponsive”, was not already made recently). If the problem
is confirmed, then it must be reported to the monitor—we
may assume that the attacker cannot block this access to all
clients—and the message must be propagated further through
gossiping. On the other hand, when a valid inconsistency
message is received, the log can immediately be considered
as untrustworthy and the message can directly be reported and
propagated, as it contains sufficient cryptographic evidence.
Also, an inconsistency message will take priority over a
warning message.
VIII. SIMULATION
A. Simulation Framework
The main challenge in evaluating a scheme such as the
one we propose is to create a reliable client-server connection
model. One important obstacle is the scarcity of authentic
traces of real-world connections (as this data is privacy-
sensitive). However, the framework that we developed and that
we describe in this section emulates realistic connections on a
worldwide scale. To be precise, the traffic of 112 countries (for
which sufficient statistical data was available) is simulated.
Only a fraction of clients execute the given gossip protocol.
This proportion of clients is referred to as the gossip factor,
denoted f . The MMD is set to 2 hours, as for the first pilot
logs run by Google and exactly one new STH is produced by
the log every MMD. In each country, the number of Internet
users was estimated with the total population [13] and the
percentage of individuals using the Internet [14].
In order to determine how many connections users perform
during the day and how these connections are distributed
among users, we used a private 24-hour-long trace of real
HTTP/HTTPS traffic from 2014 provided directly by SWITCH
(major manager of networks among universities and research
facilities in Switzerland). This data contains more than 104
million entries for HTTP and more than 74 million entries
for HTTPS, where each entry is a triplet of the form: relative
time (in seconds), client ID (anonymized), and server ID
(anonymized). For each hour, we approximated the parameters
Protocol 2: STH-and-consistency-proof gossiping (notation and auxiliary functions are defined in §V)
Client-side
Stored data: STH sa, STH sb, consistency proof pa,b, set of audited
SCTs l
Function getClientMessage() : message
if (sa = ∅) or (sb = ∅) or (pa,b = ∅) then
return ∅;
else
return (sa, sb, pa,b);
Procedure clientUpdate(t, m2)
Input: SCT t, server message m2 := (sc, sd, pc,d)
if validMessage(m2) then
checkSTHs(sa, sb, sc, sd);
if (b 6= c) and (b 6= d) then
getConsistencyProof(b, d);
if b < d then
sa ← sc;
sb ← sd;
pa,b ← pc,d;
if t 6∈ l then
se ← getSTH();
checkSTHs(sb, se);
getAuditProof(t, e);
if (sb 6= ∅) and (b < e) then
pb,e ← getConsistencyProof(b, e);
sa ← sb;
sb ← se;
pa,b ← pb,e;
else
sb ← se;
l← l ∪ {t};
Server-side
Stored data: STH with the largest tree size sn, map g, default
message m0
Configuration parameter: storage limit µ
Function getServerMessage(m1) : message
Input: client message m1 := (sa, sb, pa,b)
if (not validMessage(m1)) or (g.size() = 0) then
return ∅;
else if b ∈ g.keys() then
return g[b];
else
return m0;
Procedure serverUpdate(m1)
Input: client message m1 := (sa, sb, pa,b)
if not validMessage(m1) then
return;
if sn 6= ∅ then
checkSTHs(sa, sb, sn, g[a], g[b]);
if (a 6= n 6= b) and (a 6∈ g.keys() or b 6∈ g.keys()) then
pb,n ← getConsistencyProof(b, n);
g[b]← (sb, sn, pb,n);
if (sn = ∅) or (n < b) then
n← b;
m0 ← m1;
g[a]← m1;
else if n = b then
g[a]← m1;
while g.size() > µ do
g.removeF irst();
of a negative binomial distribution2 by using maximum-
likelihood estimation. Random numbers of connections can
then be generated and used in the simulation. As different
types of traffic are generated during different periods of
the day (for each country), we also take time zones into
consideration.
Then, it must be determined to which websites these users
connect. Amazon’s Alexa Web Information Service provides
a vast quantity of precious information in this regard. In
particular, we collected data (in June 2014) about the top
100 domains for each of the 112 countries. This includes the
number of page views per million, i.e., the number of page
views that a particular site generates among one million pages
that are viewed by typical users. Based on this distribution,
a random domain can be picked. We have also taken into
consideration the possibility that a client connects to a domain
outside of the top 100 by reducing the total number of
connections that a client perform proportionally.
We scanned the servers of all these top domains to
determine not only if they support HTTPS (e.g., by verifying
that the port 443 is open), but also if their certificate is valid,
if a connection can be established, and if they automatically
redirect clients to HTTPS. Globally, this condition is met by
287 out of 5107 servers scanned (i.e., around 5.62%). In our
2Another simpler model that can express the number of events occurring
in a period of time is the Poisson distribution. It relies on a single parameter
that corresponds to both the variance and the mean, but this is not sufficient
in our context since the variance exceeds the mean to a large extent. The
negative binomial is a generalization of the Poisson distribution [15] that
allows the variance to be different from the mean.
simulation, all these servers (and only these) are both CT-
enabled and gossiping, unless stated otherwise. This assump-
tion is both realistic, because major websites (that already
enforce the usage of TLS) are more likely to adopt new
security mechanisms rapidly; and sufficient, because these
sites generate a substantial part of the global Internet traffic
(about 33.5% of the page views of a country on average).
The validity period of all certificates is set to 24 months
(moderately below the maximum of 39 months imposed by
the CA/B Forum [16] for certificates issued after 1 April
2015). For each certificate, the date of issuance is chosen
uniformly at random in the 24 months preceding the start of
the simulation.
B. Results
We show simulation results in four distinct cases. The
first basic situation in which no gossip protocol is used can
be subdivided into two cases: when clients keep track of
the SCTs they received and verified, and when they do not.
We compare these cases with the two protocols presented
in §VI. All results were collected during a simulation of
365 days, and the gossip factor was set to 0.1% (2,462,216
gossiping clients), unless stated otherwise. Results are usually
rounded to the nearest hundredth, except when more precision
is needed. The storage limit µ was set to 10,000 messages,
but, as the storage requirements of our protocols are low, this
limit was never reached in the 365 days period.
STH distribution. Since one of our strategies consists of
keeping STHs with the largest tree size, it is worth inves-
tigating how effective our protocols are in spreading recent
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Fig. 4: Average distribution of the last 12 STHs among clients at the
end of an MMD. On the horizontal axis, 0 represents the last STH
generated by the log, −1 represents the STH that was generated 1
MMD before that, and so on.
STHs. Figure 4 illustrates how the last 12 STHs (i.e., those
that have been generated in the last 24 hours, since the MMD
is set to 2) are distributed as a percentage of clients having
them stored at the end of an MMD. We can observe that the
two non-gossiping cases form a lower and an upper bound
for the distribution of the latest STH. Indeed, when SCTs are
saved, after some time, clients do not need to contact the log
very often as they tend to visit the same domains most of
the time. The distribution is almost uniform, because clients
can keep the same STH as long as they do not connect to a
website they had never visited before. In this case, more than
78% of the clients hold an STH that is more than one-day
old. On the other hand, when SCTs are not saved, the same
information (including the latest STH) must be fetched from
the log every time an HTTPS connection is established with a
CT-enabled server. Under these circumstances, only less than
26% of gossiping clients do not hold one of the last 12 STHs.
This performance cannot be exceeded by a gossip protocol
that relies on existing client-driven connections. There might
be a bias in the results coming from the fact that we used a 24-
hour trace of HTTP(S) traffic. This trace does not necessarily
contain some clients that establish connections less often (e.g.
once a month). The lack of longer authentic traces prevents
us from modelling the system more accurately; nevertheless,
the presented results are relevant and undoubtedly helpful to
analyze the protocols.
Although distribution measurements are not directly useful
to demonstrate how well a protocol performs in detecting
attacks, they can show how much clients collaborate to obtain
their vision of the log when combined with another metric.
Indeed, there are only two ways for clients to get a recent
STH: contacting the log or receiving an appropriate gossip
message. If the distribution is close to the upper bound
and the number of STHs fetched from the log is low, it
means that the protocol achieves an efficient communication
of log-related information between clients, and attacks are
more likely to be detected rapidly. The number of STH
queries (getSTH() function) per MMD was measured to
be about 7.02 million when SCTs are not saved (one query
for each HTTPS connection), and only about 10,000 when
SCTs are saved (this concerns both gossip protocols).
Overhead. Another decisive characteristic that must be ana-
lyzed is the overhead that gossip protocols introduce. More
precisely, we express the overhead as the number of log
connections strictly generated by the gossip protocol (not
by the standard CT framework, i.e., we do not consider
queries for the latest STH and the audit proof, but only
queries for consistency proofs that are needed upon receipt
of certain gossip messages) over the total number of HTTPS
connections performed by gossiping clients. The average
number of HTTPS connections per MMD was measured to
be approximately 7.02 million in all cases, and the overhead
was about 8.58% (602,263.2 log connections per MMD)
for the STH-only protocol and only about 0.0058% (407.58
log connections) for the second protocol, when proofs are
gossiped. This constitutes a substantial overhead reduction
and shows, therefore, that gossiping consistency proofs is
indeed pertinent. In the first protocol, exactly half of the
gossip-related queries to the log originate from clients and the
other half from servers, since they need to request consistency
proofs under the same conditions, i.e., when the STHs they
exchange have a different tree size. In contrast, when the
second protocol is used, more queries (72.09%) come from
clients.
Storage. For both gossip protocols, the storage required on
the client-side (strictly for gossiping) is fixed: a few kilobytes
for, at most, a consistency proof and the pair of corresponding
STHs. Moreover, the average number of SCTs stored by
clients was measured to be about 11–12 (recall that only one
hundred websites are considered for each country). Consid-
ering that SCTs are only a few hundred bytes, this storage
is almost negligible compared to other data that browsers
usually store: history, cookies, cached media files, and so on.
On the server-side, the second protocol needs to store gossip
messages. The size of the map used to store these messages
is monotonically increasing and the maximum number of
messages that can be stored at a certain point in time is related
to the number of different STHs that have been generated by
the log. We observed that the largest map contained 4380
messages at the end of the 365 days of simulation. As an
example, a limit of 10,000 messages would require less than
16 MB of storage while being able to hold more than two
years worth of log data.
Scalability. Table I shows how the protocols behave when
we vary the gossip factor f . We also compare the situation in
which HTTPS servers in the top 100 domains are gossiping
(as before) with the situation in which only the global top
domain (google.com) is gossiping while HTTPS servers are
still CT-enabled. We observe that both protocols perform
better, in terms of distribution of recent STHs, when more
clients or more servers participate and that the overhead of
the second protocol gets even smaller when the gossip factor
is increased. It is worth noting that even when only the
global top domain (google.com) is gossiping, the protocol
achieves a performance close to the results we presented
before (with many more servers). This is explained by the
fact that google.com is responsible for an important part of
the total number of page views in all countries. Moreover, we
remark that, although the distribution results are very similar
for both protocols, the overhead is substantially lower when
proofs are gossiped. Figure 5 shows how the overhead evolves
when we change the number of gossiping servers. The second
protocol not only generates a much lower overhead than the
first one, but we see that it scales well, as the overhead
increases steadily but slowly when more servers participate
to the protocol.
Gossiping
Global top domain Top 100 domains for each country
f = 0.001% f = 0.01% f = 0.1% f = 0.001% f = 0.01% f = 0.1%
Pr
ot
.1 Latest STH 6.06 % 8.9 % 9.03 % 6.07 % 9.86 % 11.13 %
Last 12 STHs 47.67 % 66.88 % 66.79 % 54.18 % 72.1 % 73.98 %
Overhead 6.71 % 6.77 % 6.77 % 9.09 % 8.64 % 8.58 %
Pr
ot
.2 Latest STH 5.75 % 7.73 % 8.6 % 6.88 % 8.8 % 9.45 %
Last 12 STHs 51.87 % 63.23 % 64.48 % 53.83 % 69.01 % 70.01 %
Overhead 2.25 · 10−3 % 2.2 · 10−4 % 1.2 · 10−5 % 3.8 · 10−1 % 5.12 · 10−2 % 5.81 · 10−3 %
TABLE I: Average number of gossiping clients with the latest STH or any of the last 12 STHs, average overhead (as defined before), and
storage usage defined as the average number of messages stored by servers over the number of different STHs generated by the log, for both
gossip protocols. Different gossip factors f and different sets of gossiping servers are considered.
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Fig. 5: Overhead in function of the number of gossiping HTTPS
servers in the top X domains of each country (the gossip factor is
fixed to 0.01%), for both gossip protocols.
IX. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
There are two opposite scenarios of split-world attacks
in which the detectability property of our protocols can be
analyzed. The first scenario is the one in which a MITM
attack targets a single client, using an illegitimate certificate,
and the log is controlled by the attacker (e.g., a government)
to provide this certificate only to the victim. If the client
is gossiping and connects to a non-compromised gossiping
server, then there are two possibilities regarding the tree sizes
of the exchanged STHs. If they are equal, then the root hashes
will not be the same and the attack will be detected. Those
two STHs are a strong evidence that the log is misbehaving,
and anyone who receives them can acknowledge the attack.
If the tree sizes are different, then both the client and the
server will request a consistency proof that the log will not
be able to produce. This means that the log will either respond
with an incorrect proof or be unresponsive. In both cases, an
alert message will be gossiped and possibly reported to some
entity (e.g., a monitor). Here, there is no tangible evidence
that the log is malicious, so all participants in the gossip
protocol should independently try to confirm the assertion
contained in an alert message they receive to produce a signal
as strong as possible. The second attack scenario is the one in
which the whole population is divided into different parts, for
example, when a country performs a large-scale permanent
MITM attack. As soon as a gossiping client connects to a
gossiping server that is not hit by the MITM, the attack will
be detected as before. Even with a country-wide firewall,
this is very likely to happen if at least one user travels to
another country with his device and connects to a server that
supports the protocol. Of course, this statement holds only if
the number of gossiping clients and servers is sufficient.
The speed of adoption for a new security feature such
as the one we described depends on the software update
mechanism. As modern browsers are usually automatically
updated at regular intervals, a fast deployment rate could be
guaranteed for clients. On the other hand, servers usually need
to be updated manually and the adoption of a new technique
could be much slower. In any case, this is not to be considered
as a major issue as long as the protocol is scalable and the
price to pay in terms of additional connections and storage is
not too high, which was shown to be the case in §VIII-B.
In order to reduce the overhead introduced by the gossip
protocol even more, consistency proofs should be requested
in batch at regular intervals, instead of immediately when
needed. The same goes for verifying the claim contained in
a warning message. This will not only decrease the number
of requests to the log, but also avoid to fetch the same infor-
mation several times in the defined period of time. Attacks
would only be detected slightly more slowly, depending on
the value at which the interval is set.
The gossiped pieces of data are usually not privacy-
sensitive, as they should be identical for all users and thus
should not allow to infer which domains a client visited.
However, if the log fails to prove that a certificate was added
to the tree, the corresponding SCT must be reported and this
causes privacy issues. The SCT (tagged as, e.g., “not present
in the log” or “log unresponsive”) could be sent back only to
the server it came from, but this is ineffective if the server
is malicious, so it should be required that users give their
consent to gossip the fraudulent SCT.
X. REALIZATION IN PRACTICE
Protocol layer (TLS vs. HTTPS). To satisfy the deploya-
bility requirement, we used HTTPS traffic to transport gossip
messages. Hence, our protocols can be implemented either in
the TLS layer (as suggested in [17]) or in the HTTP layer.
The first option is to use a TLS extension and to introduce a
dedicated field in ClientHello and ServerHello for the gossip
messages. The advantage of such a solution is that all TLS-
supported services (e.g., SMTP over TLS) can be used for
gossiping. Unfortunately, this approach has some drawbacks
too. First, ClientHello and ServerHello messages are sent
unencrypted. Therefore, an eavesdropper could determine
whether a client is gossiping and read the exchanged mes-
sages. In such a setting, an adversary could launch a MITM
attacks only on non-gossiping users. Moreover, too many
additional bytes introduced to ClientHello or ServerHello
messages may cause latency in the TLS Handshake [18]. This
last point is crucial in a multi-log setting. The alternative
approach is to use HTTP headers. The gossip messages
would be exchanged through HTTPS requests and replies,
after the TLS Handshake is completed. This guarantees that
an eavesdropping adversary cannot even distinguish whether
a client is gossiping or not. Also, this approach allows
to send longer messages. The maximum size of an HTTP
header is a configuration parameter, usually set between 4–
16 KB. Furthermore, the gossip exchange can occur for every
HTTPS request/reply (with TLS, it happens only during the
handshake).
Implementation. To prove the feasibility and efficiency of
our proposals, Protocol 2 was implemented and evaluated for
both clients and servers. For log operations, the CT Python
API was used. The server-side component was realized with
the Django web framework, and the client-side consisted of
a simple HTTP client that connects to the server, selects a
message, and includes it into an HTTP header dedicated to
gossiping. When an HTTP request is received, the server’s
middleware checks if it contains a gossip header and then
updates the local storage accordingly. Then, the server sends
a corresponding HTTP reply and embeds the selected message
into the gossip header as well. In turn, the client receives the
reply, processes the message, and updates its storage.
Performance. To evaluate the performance of this implemen-
tation, several tests were conducted on a commodity machine
(Intel i5-3380M, 2.90 GHz with 16 GB of RAM) running
Ubuntu 14.04, with a 100 Mbps Internet connection. For
the log, one of Google’s CT log server was used, and all
operations were executed 100 times. The latency incurred by
downloading an STH, a consistency proof, or an audit proof
was on average 162 ms. The verification of STH validity,
consistency between two STHs, and SCT audit proof took
on average 68.87 ms, 0.17 ms, and 0.28 ms, respectively. The
most important computational overhead is caused by the log’s
signature verification, but it will not be noticed by users, given
that these operations are non-blocking.
XI. CONCLUSION
Detecting and disseminating the misbehavior of log
servers is the missing aspect of the current log-based PKI
architectures. In this paper, we presented the first gossip
protocols for Certificate Transparency that aim at detecting
several types of attacks by log servers. The concepts that
we developed might be adapted to other public-log ap-
proaches [19]–[22]. Our proposals do not require any overlay
network or dedicated infrastructure, and can be incrementally
deployed. We evaluated our schemes using real traffic traces
to show that the protocol in which both consistency proofs
and STHs are gossiped is the most promising approach for
detecting inconsistencies with a small overhead. Our research
showed that it is possible to implement a gossip protocol
that would greatly improve security with a small deployment
effort and without sacrificing performance or privacy. Thus,
gossip protocols will play an important role in the upcoming
deployment of Certificate Transparency.
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